Dr. Stefan Behringer

Office:
Universität Heidelberg
LS Wirtschaftstheorie II
Campus Bergheim
Bergheimer Strasse 58
69115 Heidelberg
Germany

e-mail: stefan.behringerATawi.uni-heidelberg.de

 
• Network Effects, Spillovers, and Market Structure.

Abstract:
The paper investigates the effect of spillovers in a model of endogenous technical change resulting from network effects, e.g. in the market for hand-held video consoles on the existence of a lower bound to market concentration.
Paper in pdf format .
Forthcoming: The Manchester School, doi: 10.1111/manc.12004
 
• Optimal Harvesting of a Spatial Renewable Resource (joint with Thorsten Upmann, University Duisburg-Essen).

Abstract:
In this paper we investigate optimal harvesting of a renewable natural resource. While in the standard approach the resource is located at a single point in space we allow for the resource to be distributed over the plane. Consequently, an agent who exploits the resource has to travel from one location to another. For a fixed planning horizon we investigate the speed and the time path of harvesting chosen by the agent. We show that the agent adjusts the speed of movement so that he accomplishes to visit each location only once, even in the absence of travelling cost. Since he does not come back to any location for a second harvest, it is optimal for him to fully deplete the resource upon arrival. A society interested in conserving some of the resource thus has to take measures suitable to limit the exploitative behaviour of the agent.
CESifo Working Paper No.4019 in pdf format.
 
• Direct Provision of a Public Good with Many Agents.

Abstract:
The literature on the private provision of public goods suggests a proportional relationship between incentives to free-ride and group size. However recent empirical research and casual observation of modern information technologies suggests otherwise. This paper purports a solution to the apparent paradox within a mechanism design framework tailored to modular developments within these technologies and provides a positive limit result as the number of agents gets large. (New Version 3/2013)
Paper in pdf format .
 
• Public Good Provision with Many Agents: An Example.

Abstract:
The paper provides a simple example of a general mechanism that solves the free riding problem when many agents are both users and beneficiaries of the public good such as in the case of Open Source Software or Social Networks. .
Paper in pdf format .
  

• Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry.
  
  Abstract:
  The paper looks at the effects of entry on welfare in the Telecommunications industry. The equilibrium pricing parameters for an incumbent (state) monopoly and for a duopoly situation are determined. A welfare comparison between the monopoly and duopoly equilibrium situation is undertaken and the welfare consequences of alternative access pricing regimes are investigated.
  Paper in pdf format
  Published: Economics Letters, 2009, Vol. 102(3), p.185-188.
  
  
• Equilibrium Market and Pricing Structures in Virtual Platform Duopoly: Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites revisited.
  
  Abstract:
  We investigate the equilibrium market structure in virtual platform duopoly such as that of eBay and Yahoo! auctions. Building on the model of Ellison, Fudenberg, & Möbius (2004) we take full account of the complexity of network effects on such platforms. We extend the model by looking at the implication of exogenous and endogenous buyer and seller charges (i.e. vertical product differentiation) making use of the concept of insulating tariffs. This extension brings in line the theory with the empirical findings of Brown & Morgan (2006). Eventually we investigate welfare effects, look at the viability of duopoly with size differentials, and the implications for large markets. (New version 3/2013)
  Paper in pdf format .
  
  
• Asymmetric Equilibria and Competitive Access Pricing in the Telecommunications Industry.
  
  Abstract:
  This paper looks at competition in the telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network-based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level and thus reconcile theory with regulatory practice.
  Paper in pdf format
  Published: Int. J. Management and Network Economics, 2012, Vol.2, No.3, p.257-281.
  
  
• Mobile Call Termination and Collusion under Asymmetry (joint with Edmond Baranes and Jean-Christophe Poudou, University of Montpellier 1).
  
  Abstract:
  This paper looks at duopolistic competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. We employ the standard Hotelling framework of horizontal product differentiation but allow for differentiation in a second dimension. Modulo locations consumers may have different demand elasticities with respect to the two networks which can capture, for example, differences in network histories. The implications of these asymmetries on the possibility to sustain collusion are investigated under alternative access pricing regimes. (New version 11/2012)
  Paper in pdf format
  
  
  
• Price Wars in Two-Sided Markets: The case of the UK Quality Newspaper Industry (joint with Lapo Filistrucchi, Tilburg University).
  
  Abstract:
  This paper investigates the price war in the UK quality newspaper industry in the 1990s. We show that the empirical evidence is in accordance with a substantial change in the optimal finance mix of newspapers as advertising becomes the dominant source of newspaper revenue. The evidence brought forward at the time is not sufficient to establish a case of predatory pricing as it has neglected the critical two-sidedness of firms and necessitates further study.
  Paper in pdf format .
  
  
• Hotelling Competition and Political Differentiation with more than two Newspapers (joint with Lapo Filistrucchi, Tilburg University).
  
  Abstract:
  We analyse a newspaper market where media firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. Firms first choose the political position of their newspaper, then set cover prices and advertising tariffs. We build on the duopoly work in two-sided markets of Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001, 2002) who show that advertising financing can lead to minimum political differentiation. We extend their model to more than two firms and show that concerns for the emergence of a Pensée Unique as a result of advertising financing increase as the number of firms increases. In a simulation exercise we derive equilibrium locations and the welfare implications of an asymmetric shock as motivated by the empirical findings in Behringer and Filistrucchi (2010b). (New version 11/2011)
  Paper in pdf format .

• 2012 - Acting Professor (Lehrstuhlvertreter), Professur für VWL, Wirtschaftstheorie II, Universität Heidelberg.

 
Long CV in pdf format (11kb)

Professor Martin Hellwig
MPI for Research on Collective Goods
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn
Germany

Professor John Sutton
Department of Economics
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
England

Professor Patrick Rey
IDEI, Université des Sciences Sociales
Manufacture des Tabacs
21, Allée de Brienne Bât. F
31000 Toulouse
France

 

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