

UNIVERSITÄT HEIDELBERG

ALFRED WEBER-INSTITUT

DR. STEFAN BEHRINGER



Master / Diplom

WiSe 2012/13

Titel: Antitrust and Regulation under Asymmetric Information
Language of Instruction: English
Organizational Meeting: 7.11.2012 at 13:30 in room 00.028
Blockseminar: 25.-26.01.2013 in rooms of the Library and room 00.028

Prerequisites:

Prerequisite for successful completion of this seminar is a good knowledge of calculus and some statistical basics. Preferably you have taken an advanced microeconomics course such as Game Theory with Applications course before.

Registration:

Takes place at the Organizational Meeting.

Content:

In this seminar we will study issues arising in antitrust, procurement, and delegation under symmetric and asymmetric information, compare them, and put them into regulatory context. Related recent academic articles may be added to the readings below. Seminar presentations take place prior to the submission of the final (seminar) papers and are discussed in class. The final grade is based on 30% presentation, 20% discussion, and 50% paper.

Relevant Readings:

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. (J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole), 1993, MIT Press.

The Theory of Incentives: the Principal-Agent Model (J.J. Laffont and D. Martimort), 2002, Princeton UP.

Background Reading:

The Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, (W.K. Viscusi, J.E. Harrington, J.M. Vernon), 2005, 4th edition, MIT Press.